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–  Slow,	  reacHve	  regulatory	  process	  
–  Flying	  “economy”	  




–  High	  Human	  Error	  rates	  !!	  
2	  
Human	  Performance	  In	  RPAS	  
AviaHon	  accident	  stats	  
•  Although	  percentages	  vary,	  most	  would	  agree	  that	  
	  somewhere	  between	  60-­‐80%	  of	  aviaHon	  accidents	  are	  
	  due,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  to	  human	  error	  (Shappell	  &	  Wiegmann,	  1996).	  
	  
RPAS	  accident	  stats	  
•  About	  100	  Predator	  Accidents	  from	  1997	  –	  2005	  ;	  51%	  
	  mishaps	  involving	  crewmember	  acts	  (Tvaryanas,	  2005)	  
•  Tvaryanas	  (2004)	  on	  mishap	  epidemiology	  states	  that	  Human	  System	  Interface	  
(HSI)	  issues	  are	  discussed	  in	  89%	  of	  the	  Predator	  accidents	  and	  are	  cited	  as	  a	  
causal	  factor	  in	  44%	  of	  those	  accidents.	  	  
•  Mishaps	  in	  the	  ﬁrst	  few	  years	  were	  o6en	  abributed	  to	  equipment	  failures,	  while	  
mishaps	  in	  the	  last	  three	  years	  were	  predominantly	  operator	  error	  (Nullmyer,	  	  et	  
al,	  2007)	  
•  As	  drone	  use	  has	  taken	  oﬀ,	  human	  error	  remains	  a	  leading	  cause	  of	  unmanned	  
aerial	  vehicle	  crashes.	  (Popular	  Science,	  2013).	  
•  Why	  ?	  	  How	  can	  we	  do	  beber	  ?	  
Current UAV Operator Interface Issues 
4	   4	  
Too many inputs required 
to implement commands 
(e.g., 22 key strokes to 
turn on the auto pilot ) 
Visualization is poor and 
perpetuates mistakes  
Multiple screens require 












Narrow visual field of  
view 




Highly loaded visual channel Lengthy process to 
handoff  vehicle control 
Add-on systems (i.e., 
Falconview) provide needed 
functionality but cannot 
interface directly with core GCS 
Varying methods to input 
data 
Limited alert cues to warnings 
where messages can be 
hidden 
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Example	  
5	  
Courtesy	  of	  Former	  NASA	  UAS	  Pilot	  
6	  
How	  can	  we	  replace	  the	  informaHon	  ?	  
7	  
Is	  it	  Pilot	  Error	  ?	  
A	  lible	  background:	  
•  April	  26,	  2006	  (NTSB,	  2006)	  
•  Predator	  B	  with	  two	  side-­‐by-­‐side	  consoles	  
•  Power	  lever	  operates	  in	  two	  modes	  
–  Sensor	  –	  controls	  Iris,	  middle	  posiHon	  locks	  
–  Pilot	  –	  engine	  control,	  middle	  posiHon	  shuts	  oﬀ	  fuel	  
Events:	  
•  Pilot’s	  console	  “locked-­‐up”	  	  
•  Pilot	  took	  over	  sensor	  console	  
•  Did	  NOT	  perform	  transfer	  checklist	  
•  Power	  lever	  was	  in	  middle	  posiHon	  (now	  fuel	  shut	  oﬀ)	  
•  Warning	  tone	  (but	  all	  the	  same;	  	  
thought	  to	  be	  temp	  lost	  link)	  
•  3:50	  a.m.,	  A/C	  impacts	  the	  ground	  near	  Nogales,	  AZ	  
	  
8	  
UAS	  Pilot	  Quotes	  
“This	  thing’s	  kind	  of	  climbing	  like	  a	  pig.	  Climb,	  you	  pig.	  .	  .	  .	  Boy,	  this	  is	  going	  to	  be	  <ght.	  .	  .	  .	  	  Okay,	  interes<ng.	  We	  are	  
falling	  out	  of	  the	  sky.”	  
UnidenHﬁed	  pilot	  of	  a	  Predator	  that	  crashed	  near	  Creech	  Air	  Force	  Base	  in	  Nevada	  on	  May	  13,	  2013.	  
	  
“Drone	  just	  pitched	  up.	  Drone’s	  pitching	  over.	  Drone	  is	  uh,	  crashed	  and	  destructed,	  at	  uh,	  the	  end	  of	  the	  runway.”	  
UnidenHﬁed	  pilot	  of	  a	  chase	  plane	  that	  was	  following	  a	  QF-­‐4E	  target	  drone	  before	  it	  crashed	  at	  Tyndall	  Air	  Force	  
Base	  in	  Florida	  on	  July	  17,	  2013.	  
	  
“We’re	  in	  the	  soup	  here.	  	  .	  .	  .	  Dude,	  uh,	  we’re	  not	  sure	  what	  the	  aircraE	  is	  doing.	  	  .	  .	  .	  Yeah,	  we	  crashed.”	  
UnidenHﬁed	  pilot	  of	  an	  Air	  Force	  Reaper	  as	  it	  crashed	  in	  Douglas	  County,	  Nev.,	  on	  Dec.	  5,	  2012.	  
	  
“Whoa.	  .	  .	  .	  I	  don’t	  know	  what	  the	  hell	  just	  happened.”	  
	  
“Where	  the	  hell	  is	  —	  where	  is	  the	  runway?	  It’s	  all	  the	  way	  over	  here.	  I	  overshot.	  Oh,	  shit.	  I	  think	  we	  lost	  the	  engine.	  
Oh,	  shit,	  oh	  damn,	  oh	  my	  God,	  what	  is	  that?	  .	  .	  .	  What	  was	  all	  that	  stuﬀ	  I	  just	  hit?”	  
Air	  Force	  Capt.	  Mabhew	  Scardaci	  as	  his	  Predator	  crashed	  into	  a	  row	  of	  empty	  shipping	  containers	  at	  Kandahar	  Air	  
Base	  on	  May	  5,	  2011.	  
	  
“I	  couldn’t	  tell	  which	  way	  it	  was	  turning,	  or	  if	  it	  was	  straight,	  if	  it	  was	  upside	  down,	  or	  if	  it	  was	  right-­‐side	  up.	  .	  .	  .	  I	  
couldn’t	  grasp	  what	  was	  happening	  with	  the	  aircraE.	  And	  he	  said	  he	  thought	  it	  was	  upside	  down.”	  
UnidenHﬁed	  Predator	  pilot	  to	  invesHgators	  trying	  to	  determine	  how	  and	  why	  she	  ﬂew	  the	  drone	  upside	  down	  before	  
it	  crashed	  near	  Kandahar	  Air	  Base	  on	  Jan.	  15,	  2010.	  
	  	  
“Um,	  I	  guess	  I’ll	  just	  be	  blunt	  and	  say	  not	  well.”	  
The	  Predator	  pilot	  who	  ﬂew	  upside	  down,	  when	  asked	  by	  invesHgators	  how	  well	  her	  training	  had	  prepared	  her	  for	  
such	  an	  incident.	  
	  
9	  
A	  VERY	  ParHal	  List	  of	  Issues	  
•  Pilot	  selecHon/	  cerHﬁcaHon/	  
training	  
•  GCS	  database	  compaHbility	  
•  Lack	  of	  GCS	  Standards	  
•  Pre-­‐ﬂight	  planning	  
•  Lack	  of	  sensory	  cues	  
•  GCS	  Human	  Factors	  Best	  
PracHces	  
•  Clumsy	  automaHon	  
•  Detect	  and	  Avoid	  	  
•  Well	  Clear	  
•  Collision	  Avoidance	  
•  Lost	  Link	  
•  Visual	  clearances	  
•  Surface	  operaHons	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How	  can	  the	  industry	  reduce	  human	  	  
performance	  errors	  ?	  
•  Introduce	  Human	  Factors	  early	  on	  –	  in	  a	  “human-­‐centered”	  design	  process	  	  
•  Design	  to	  let	  people	  perform	  the	  tasks	  where	  they	  are	  superior	  
–  Novel	  condiHons	  
–  Pabern	  recogniHon	  
–  Decision	  making	  
•  Let	  Computers	  do	  what	  they	  are	  good	  at	  
–  Number	  crunching	  
–  Vigilance	  
–  IntegraHng	  diverse	  sources	  and	  large	  amounts	  of	  informaHon	  
•  Don’t	  automate	  with	  “le6over”	  principle	  
•  Design	  robust,	  ﬂexible	  automaHon	  that	  is	  mission/scenario	  driven	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A	  Few	  Current	  Eﬀorts	  
•  NASA	  –	  UAS	  IntegraHon	  into	  the	  NAS	  
–  Human	  Systems	  
•  Displays,	  alerts,	  GCS	  
–  CommunicaHons	  
–  Detect	  and	  Avoid	  
•  DoD	  
–  AFRL	  –	  Airborne	  Sense	  and	  Avoid	  
–  Army	  –	  Ground	  Based	  Sense	  and	  Avoid	  
•  FAA	  Technical	  Center	  
–  Minimum	  InformaHon	  displays	  
12	  
